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A Categorial Syntax for Verbs of Perception 
Robin Clark and Gerhard Jager 
1 Introduction 
"Categorial Grammar" is not a particular grammar formalism, let alone a the-
ory of grammar, but rather a cover term for a family of quite diverse ap-
proaches to natural language syntax. This cover term is nonetheless useful, 
since all these theories share important characteristics. Besides the common 
foundation in the works of Ajdukiewicz (1935) and Bar-Hillel (1953) and the 
use of complex syntactic categories built up from atoms with slashes, they are 
based on two related premises that distinguish them from all other theories of 
grammar: 
1. The locus of grammatical generalizations is the lexicon. 
2. Constituent structure plays no role in grammatical theory. 
This does not entail that Categorial Grammars deny the existence of con-
stituent structure (in fact, Bar-Hillel's Basic Categorial Grammar and Lam-
bek's (1961) non-associative grammar calculus assume a rigid binary branch-
ing structure). However, all Categorial Grammars assume that constituent 
structure cannot enter grammatical description. 
The hypothesis that constituent structure is immaterial to grammatical de-
scriptions contrasts sharply with the perspective found in the generative tradi-
tion. Generative grammar is largely grounded on relations like c-command, 
m-command and government which are based on tree geometry. Some the-
ories have defined grammatical relations like subject and object entirely in 
terms of constituent structure; for example, the subject of a category X is that 
nominal which occurs the Spec( X). 
Since such a strategy is not viable in Categorial Grammar (CG hence-
forth), researchers working in this tradition usually do without notions like 
"subject" etc. The bundle of properties that are associated with subjects are 
considered to be logically independent. So it seems that CG misses an impor-
tant generalizations. 
The paper tries to counter this objection by demonstrating that the con-
figurational notion of "subject" in fact leads to analyses that are descriptively 
inadequate. This point will be made by a case study of naked infinitive (hence-
forth: NI) perception reports as in: 
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(1) Jackie saw Oswald shoot Kennedy. 
Several tests indicate that the accusative NP Oswald is the subject of the 
embedded VP shoot Kennedy. Under a configurational notion of"subject" this 
implies that the string Oswald shoot Kennedy forms a sentential constituent. 
On the other hand, there is firm evidence both from syntax and semantics that 
this string should not be considered a constituent. We will attempt to show that 
(a) in a categorial setting, some of the subject properties of the accusative NP 
in Nl perception reports can be derived without recourse to constituent struc-
ture, and (b) that this frees the way to a fairly simple semantics of perception 
verbs that solves most puzzles from the literature in a straightforward way. 
2 Subject Properties and NI Perception Reports 
Compare the following two sentences: 
(2) a. John saw that Bill left. 
b. John saw Bill leave. 
Examples (2a) and (2b) both involve John's perception of something, although 
their entailments are rather different. Example (2a), epistemic perception, en-
tails that John has perceived that Bill left and has understood that Bill left. In 
other words, John has understood the content of his perceptions; the following 
should be anomalous: 
(3) John saw that Bill left but he didn't know it. 
Notice that example (2a) does not entail that John actually saw the event of 
Bill's leaving. He could, in fact, have drawn the inference that Bill left through 
a fairly complex chain of deductions. 
Example (2b) is quite different. In this case, John must actually have 
visually perceived the event of Bill's leaving although he may not have under-
stood that that was what he saw. As Barwise (1981) observes, the following 
sentence: 
(4) Nixon saw Mrs. Wood erase the tape. 
does not imply that Nixon understood what he was seeing. He may have 
thought that she was engaged in a peculiar calisthenic exercise, for example. 
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Barwise argues that the tensed complement to a perception verb, as in (2a) in-
volves "epistemic perception," that is, perception with some cogitation, while 
the naked infinitive complement, as in (2b ), involves non-epistemic percep-
tion, that is raw perception without any additional non-perceptual cogitation. 
Thus, I can see John embezzle money without seeing that John is embezzling 
money simply because I can perceive events in the world without understand-
ing their import. 
These intuitions have led to the standard analysis of the syntactic proper-
ties of verbs of perceptual report. Epistemic perception is a relation between 
an individual and a proposition. Assuming that the syntactic category CP cor-
responds to propositions, then, syntactically, this corresponds to a CP comple-
ment to the perception verb. What about non-epistemic perception? Barwise 
argued that the proper syntactic analysis was along the lines shown in (5): 
(5) [vP see[xP John [vn run]]] 
where X P is some category distinct from CP. The representation in (5) is 
meant as a cover for a set of analyses that take the immediately post-verbal NP 
as forming a constituent with the naked infinitive. A direct consequence of this 
analysis is that the denotation of X P must be distinct from CP since (2a) and 
(2b) are not synonymous. Since CPs denote propositions, XP, whatever its 
category, must denote something other than a proposition; Barwise argues that 
X P must denote a scene, a visually perceived situation. This, in turn, lends 
support to his thesis that situations are a basic semantic category. 
Syntactic facts prima facie support this syntactic analysis. To start with, 
non-thematic elements can occur in the postverbal position (as pointed out by 
Gee 1977:468): 
(6) a. John saw it rain. 
b. ?I've never seen there be so many complaints from students before.1 
c. John saw the shit hit the fan. 
Example (6a) shows that weather it can occur in the postverbal position. In 
(6b), presentational there occurs in this position and in (6c) an idiom chunk 
can occur in this position with its idiomatic interpretation. Note that weather 
it, presentational there and idiom chunks have the property that they are, in 
some sense, non-referential. 
Consider, first, examples (6a) and (6b). According to classical Govern-
ment-Binding theory, the only way that the postverbal NP could be a direct 
1This is given as grammatical by Gee (1977). 
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object of the verb is if the verb assigns it a thematic role; this is the content 
of the 0-Criterion. By "direct object" we mean, of course, that the NP is a 
sister to the verb in the parse tree. But if the position were associated with 
a thematic role, then non-referential elements would be excluded from that 
position. The only syntactic position that is both non-thematic and associated 
with a grammatical function is the structural subject position and, therefore, 
non-referential elements are restricted to this position unless they are part of 
an idiom that includes the entire verb phrase as well. Turning to example (6c), 
we see that the postverbal NP receives its idiomatic interpretation. Therefore, 
it is non-referential and cannot be a sister to the main verb. This again shows 
that the postverbal NP in NI complement examples is a structural subject and 
not a direct object. The only way to satisfy this condition is if the postverbal 
NP forms a constituent with the naked infinitive. 
Thus, NI constructions seem to class with so-called "Exceptional Case 
Marking" constructions, shown in (7), and small clause constructions2, shown 
in (8), in allowing a non-thematic element to interceded between the verb and 
the embedded predicate. 
(7) a. John believes Bill to have stolen the car. 
b. John believes it to be raining. 
c. John believes it to be obvious that Bill stole the car. 
d. John believes there to have been a riot in the park. 
e. John believes the shit to have hit the fan. 
(8) a. John considers Bill a genius. 
b. John considers it obvious that Bill stole the car. 
The crucial point here is that the presence of "a-thematic" material is diag-
nostic of the grammatical function subject; the grammaticality of the (b-e) 
examples in (7) show that the postverbal NP is a true subject of the following 
predicate and not the structural object of believe. We must, therefore, contrast 
the behavior of the postverbal NP in (7) with its behavior in an object control 
construction: 
(9) a. John persuaded Bill to steal the car. 
b. *John persuaded it to rain. 
c. *John persuaded it to be obvious that Bill stole the car. 
2Because their predicates are not verbal, small clause constructions do not show the 
same range of non-thematic material in the following position. We take this as largely 
tangential to our main point. 
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d. *John persuaded there to be a riot in the park. 
e. *John persuaded the shit to hit the fan. 
The contrast between the ECM constructions in (7) and the control construc-
tions in (9) present CG with an interesting problem. Generative grammar ac-
counts for the contrast by associating subject properties with a particular piece 
of tree geometry, where, by subject property we mean things like: 
(10) a. The subject is allowed to be non-thematic; 
b. The subject is the "target" (or "landing site") of raising operations; 
c. The subject is a "licensed" controller; 
d. The subject is a "trigger" for certain agreement relations; 
e. The presence of a subject defines local domains for binding. 
f. Subjects are islands to extraction. 
The list in (1 0) can, of course, be expanded and clarified. Our point is that 
in classical generative accounts all of the properties in (10) are unified under 
a particular geometric approach to grammatical relations; thus, establishing 
one of the properties in ( 10) is sufficient to establish constituent structure and 
endow to element in question with the full array of subject properties. 
Grammatical subjects are traditionally treated as possible landing sites 
for raising processes like subject-to-subject raising (SSR) and passive. Nl 
constructions admit get passives but be passives are more marked: 
(11) a. John saw Bill get examined by a doctor. 
b. *?John saw Bill be examined by a doctor. 
Furthermore, the post-verbal position in NI constructions admits only a few 
cases of SSR: 
(12) a. John saw Bill appear to unlock the safe. 
b. ?John saw Bill seem to escape from the handcuffs. 
c. *John saw Bill be likely to drink too much. 
d. *John saw Bill tend to drive on the wrong side of the road. 
The unacceptability of examples (12c) and (12d) are easily accounted for on 
the basis of semantic properties of the embedded predicate; it is difficult to 
imagine the exact visual manifestations of being likely to drink too much and 
tending to drive on the wrong side of the road, both properties being propensi-
ties that should be treated modally. Appearing and seeming, on the other hand, 
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can involve deliberate deceptions that can be visually realized-stage magi-
cians make this their stock in trade. Because of this intentionality, appear and, 
to a lesser extent, seem may involve semantic relations between the "raised" 
subject and the predicate that are unavailable in the true raising constructions 
associated with likely and tend. Similarly, get passives may be preferred over 
be passives in NI constructions because of secondary semantic properties as-
sociated with the former but unavailable in the latter; compare, for example, 
the contrast between get and be in certain imperative constructions: 
(13) a. Don't get killed. 
b. *Don't be killed. 
The contrast in (13) is probably attributable to differences in the aspectual 
properties associated with get and be. These differences may also account for 
the contrast between (lla) and (llb). In particular, be passives tend to have a 
more stative flavor than get passives, a fact which may limit their distribution 
in NI constructions. As was the case for the distribution of pleonastics, then, 
raising and passive provide only equivocal support for the subject status of the 
post-verbal NP in NI constructions; while the post-verbal NP does show some 
subject properties, other factors associated with the semantics of perceptual 
reports intervene. 
A further subject property involves the distribution of anaphors and here 
the facts are much more straightforward. Putting aside formal details, let us 
suppose, following classical Government-Binding Theory, that subjects create 
a minimal domain for binding; that is, the presence of a structural subject on 
a constituent guarantees that a syntactic anaphor like himself or each other 
must be bound within that constituent while pronominals like her or them 
must be unbound in the same domain. It follows that if the postverbal NP in NI 
constructions is a structural subject, then it should create a minimal domain for 
binding. The following data are consistent with this view of binding domains: 
(14) a. John saw Mary scratch herself. 
b. *John saw Mary scratch himself. 
c. John saw Mary scratch him. 
d. *John saw Mary scratch her. 
Examples (14a) and (14b) show that anaphors like herself must indeed find 
their antecedent within the domain defined by the postverbal NP; Mary in 
example (14a) is proximate to the anaphor herself and, so, is a legal antecedent 
for it; John in example (14b) is too distant to serve as a legal antecedent for 
A CATEGORIAL SYNTAX FOR VERBS OF PERCEPTION 21 
himself since the NP Mary inscribes an opaque domain for binding due to 
its status as a subject. Similarly, examples (14c) and (14d) show that John 
can be a possible antecedent for the pronoun him because Mary defines the 
minimal domain within which the pronoun must be free. Equally, the pronoun 
her in (14d) cannot be coreferential with Mary because the latter is within the 
pronoun's minimal domain; it cannot be coreferential with John because they 
disagree in gender. 
Finally, we note that subjects tend to be islands to extraction: 
(15) a. *whoi did friends of ti visit Bill? 
b. *which sainti does Fred consider stories about t; utter fabrications? 
The ungrarnmaticality of the examples in (15) can be attributed to the fact that 
the wh-element is associated with a gap inside a subject, a tensed clause in 
(15a) and an small clause in (15b). The post-verbal NP in NI constructions is 
likewise an island for extraction: 
(16) *whoi did John see a friend of ti steal a car? 
The analysis of the post-verbal NP in NI constructions as a true subject can 
immediately treat ( 16) as a violation of the islandhood of subjects. 
As we have seen, the accusatiye NP in NI perception reports shows prop-
erties that are traditionally taken to be indicative of subjects. Under the con-
figurational definition of "subject", it is thus inevitable to consider the string 
[ N Pace V P;nf] as a constituent. 
In the next section we will collect a series of syntactic arguments that 
challenge this conclusion. 
3 Other Syntactic Tests for Constituency 
Observations concerning coordination and anaphora also point towards a one-
constituent analysis. This can be seen from examples (17a) and (17b). 
(17) a. John saw Mary enter and Bill leave? 
b. John saw Mary enter, and Bill saw it too. 
Akmajian (1977) points out that virtually all tests for constituency apart from 
coordination and pronominalization indicate that the complement of Nl per-
ception verbs do not form a constituent though. So they cannot appear in the 
postcopular position of pseudoclefts: 
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(18) *What we saw was Raquel Welch take a bath. 
Neither can they be inserted into clefted positions: 
(19) *It was Raquel Welch take a bath that we saw. 
They cannot be right node raised: 
(20) *?We could hear, but we couldn't see, Raquel Welch take a bath. 
Finally, they cannot undergo object deletion: 
(21) *Raquel Welch take a bath is a breathtaking· sight to see. 
Additional evidence against a one-constituent analysis comes from top-
icalization in German. The underlying sentence structure in German is verb 
final. Main clauses display V-2, i.e., one constituent is obligatorily fronted, 
and the finite verb is placed immediately after this constituent. Thus if a string 
is a constituent, we expect that it can be topicalized. Let us apply this test to 
NI perception reports. The underlying word order can be seen in an embedded 
clause like (22): 
(22) weil der Polizistjemanden fliehen gesehen hat. 
since the policeman[nom] somebody[acc] escape[inf] seen[part] has. 
'since the policeman saw somebody escape.' 
The topicalization test indicates that N Pace + V P do not form a con-
stituent, while the sequence "embedded VP+matrix Verb" do: 
(23) a. ??? Jemanden fliehen hat der Polizist gesehen. 
Somebody escape has the policeman seen. 
b. Fliehen gesehen hat der Polizist jemanden. 
Escape seen has the policeman somebody. 
So the appropriate bracketing for (22) should be (24a) rather than (24b ): 
(24) a. weil der Polizist [ jemanden [fliehen gesehen hat]] 
b. weil der Polizist [jemanden fliehen] gesehen hat. 
All these observations indicate that the appropriate syntactic structure for 
NI perception reports should be like the trees in (25) for English and Ger-
man respectively rather than the structure in (5), neither of which involves an 
embedded small clause. 
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All detailed studies of the semantics of perception verbs that we are aware of 
start with a one-constituent analysis (see for instance Barwise 1981, Higgin-
botham 1983, Vlach 1983, van der Does 1991). And even though the ontolog-
ical background differs considerably, they agree on the following: 
1. Perception is a relation between an agent and an abstract object (scene/si-
tuation, event, partial model etc.). 
2. The [N Pace V P] constituent in NI perception reports denotes a set of sit-
uations (events ... ). 
3. John sees NP VP can be paraphrased as John sees a situation (event ... ) s, 
and s E II[NP VPJII. 
Let us suppose, as seems reasonable, that active and passive sentences 
are supported by the same set of scenes and, so, denote the same proposi-
tion. 3 In particular, (26a) and (26b) are true paraphrases, differing only in 
their pragmatic contributions and that (26c) differs from the other two only in 
the contribution of get to the interpretation of the sentence: 
(26) a. Oswald assassinated Kennedy. 
b. Kennedy was assassinated by Oswald. 
c. Kennedy got assassinated by Oswald. 
Furthermore, let us follow the standard assumption that the semantic contribu-
tion of a passive sentence in an embedded context is exactly comparable, up 
to pragmatics, to the semantic contribution of an active sentence in the same 
context; thus, (27a) is a paraphrase of (27b): 
(27) a. John saw that Oswald assassinated Kennedy. 
3Vlach likely wouldn't agree with this. His view is discussed below. 
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b. John saw that Kennedy was assassinated by Oswald. 
Notice, in particular, that no privileged relationship holds between John and 
either Oswald or Kennedy in either (27a) and (27b). 
Compare this situation in (27) with the pair of sentences in (28), first 
observed by Vlach (1983): 
(28) a. John saw Oswald shoot Kennedy. 
b. John saw Kennedy get shot by Oswald. 
The behavior of the sentences in (28) is peculiar given the small clause analysis 
of NI complements, since (28a) and (28b) are not paraphrases of each other 
and differ by more than the contribution of get to (28b ). In particular, for (28a) 
to be true it must be the case the John saw Oswald exactly when the latter shot 
Kennedy; John need not have seen Kennedy at all. For (28b) to be true, on the 
other hand, John must have seen Kennedy at the moment that he got shot by 
Oswald; he need not have seen Oswald at all. Thus, while (28a) is not true of 
anyone, many people have shared John's visual experience in (28b). 
In brief, it would seem that the subject of the perception verb and the 
postverbal NP stand in some special relationship in non-epistemic perceptual 
reports, a relationship that is wholly absent in epistemic perceptual reports. To 
be more precise, we claim that the inference pattern in (29a) is valid, but the 
one in (29b) isn't. 
(29) a. x saw y V P f= x saw y 
b. x saw y [ v p V z] f= x saw z 
The invalidity of (29b) is demonstrated by (28). To substantiate the claim 
that (29a) is valid, let us consider three putative counterexamples. Suppose, 
first, that John is standing behind an opaque plastic screen, using magnets to 
move metal puppets on the other side of the screen. Suppose Mary observes 
the movement of the puppets, without seeing John. Can Mary use (30) to 
report her perception? 
(30) I saw John move the puppets. 
Gee (1977) claims that she can. The judgments ofthose we have asked is that 
although (30) is marginal in this context, it can be so used just in case Mary 
is absolutely certain that no one else could be responsible for the movement 
of the puppets. In this case, seeing puppet movement is tantamount to direct 
perception of John. 
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Similarly, consider the case where Mary is separated from a forest by a 
large hill, so that she cannot see the forest (this example is also due to Gee 
1977). Observing a huge billow of smoke rising over the hill, can Mary later 
use (31) to report her experience? 
(31) I saw the forest bum. 
Again, the consensus of those we have asked is that (31) is odd in the above 
context. We can sharpen the intuition by considering the following sentence: 
(32) I saw the forest bum even though I didn't see the forest. 
According to our intuitions, this sentence is contradictory, no matter what 
background knowledge we assume. 
The same argumentation applies ceteris paribus to an argument from van 
der Does (1991), who in tum attributes it to Robin Cooper. He raises the 
question whether an entailment relation holds between (33a) and (33b): 
(33) a. Daniel saw Lucia phone Henry. 
b. Daniel saw Lucia. 
Vander Does (op. cit., p 245) discusses the following scenario: "Imag-
ine Lucia, Henry and Daniel each sitting in separate rooms. There are phones 
which enable Lucia and Henry to speak to each other, but only when Lucia 
phones Henry an oscilloscope in Daniel's room will show a patterns charac-
teristic for Lucia's voice. Now suppose Daniel saw the patterns, can one report 
the fact by saying [(33a)]?" Vander Does claims that at least some subjects 
answered affirmatively, since "perceiving the pattern on the oscilloscope is 
perceiving a representation of Lucia, much as perceiving a video-recording of 
her would have been. And clearly in the latter sense [(33a)] might be used." 
We agree that (33a) might be true in such a situation, but so would (33b), and 
for the very same reason. In other words there might be some vagueness as to 
how direct direct perception should be, but the inference pattern is not affected 
by that. 
To sum up the discussion so far, we observe a special semantic relation-
ship between the matrix subject and the accusative NP in NI perception re-
ports. In other words, N Pace V P don't form a semantic unit. This indicates 
that they don't form a syntactic unit either. 
It should be mentioned that Vlach (1983), who was presumably the first 
to notice this special relationship, nevertheless uses a one-constituent analysis. 
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According to him, the difference in meaning between (28a) and (28b) is due 
to the fact that the denotation of Kennedy shot by Oswald consists of events 
that include Kennedy's location, while Oswald shoot Kennedy denotes a set of 
events that are locally connected to Oswald. Vlach doesn't give an explana-
tion for this asymmetry, but apparently he assumes the event descriptions that 
include a subject denote events that are located at or around the location of the 
referent of the subject. 
To test this assumption, consider (34). 
(34) Jackie saw Oswald's assassination of Kennedy. 
Despite the fact that the subject of the event description is Oswald and 
Jackie didn't see Oswald, the sentences is true. So the location of an event that 
is described by an event noun is not determined by the location of the referent 
of the subject. Events that are described by tensed sentences do not confirm a 
special status of the subject either. 
(35) a. Oswald shot Kennedy. 
b. ?That happened in the Texas Book Depository. 
c. ?That happened in the Presidential Limousine. 
d. That happened in Dallas. 
It appears that an event that is described by a tensed clause has to include 
all participants, not just the referent of the subject. So we may conclude that 
our argumentation above is supported. The accusative NP and the embedded 
VP shouldn't be considered to be a semantic unit. 
What about the arguments in favor of a one-constituent analysis? There 
were two that didn't rely on grammatical functions, coordination and anaphora. 
In the next section, we will demonstrate that the former argument is not con-
clusive; non-constituents may be conjoined. Anaphora isn't a conclusive ar-
gument either. It is generally held nowadays that anaphora resolution operates 
on semantic entities rather than on syntactic constituents. We will argue below 
the meaning of (17b) does involve the event of Mary's entering, even though 
it does not correspond to any constituent. So we expect anaphoric reference to 
it to be possible. 
5 The Semantics of Verbs of Perception 
As our starting point we take the semantics of verbs of perception as proposed 
by Higginbotham (1983). This decision is of little significance, other propos-
als like Barwise's or van der Does' could be modified in a similar fashion. 
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Higginbotham assumes that verbs that can occur in the complement of NI per-
ception reports have an event argument, and that the logical form of a sentence 
like (36a) is (36b). 
(36) a. John saw Mary leave. 
b. 3e(LEAVE(M, e) 1\ John sees e) 
The variable e ranges over events here. The verb see that occurs with NI 
complements is thus semantically reduced to simple transitive see. As ar-
gued above, this semantics cannot be correct since then seeing Oswald shoot 
Kennedy would come down to seeing the whole event of Oswald's assassina-
tion of Kennedy, which in tum entails seeing Kennedy. The truth conditions 
of 
(37) Jackie saw Oswald shoot Kennedy. 
are much weaker. To establish its truth, it is sufficient that Jackie saw that 
part of the complex assassination event the directly involved Oswald, i.e. his 
aiming and pulling the trigger. To accommodate this intuition, let us assume 
that for each participant x of an event e, there is a unique subevent ex of e that 
has x as its only participant. We won't spell out this operation formally here, 
but the intuition should be clear enough. So the logical form of (37) should be 
(38) 3e(SHOOT(LHO, JFK, e) 1\ Jackie sees eLHO) 
It goes without saying that such a logical form can only be derived composi-
tionally if the accusative NP Oswald is an argument of the matrix verb. This 
in mind, we can give the following lexical semantics of see: 
(39) >.Pxy.3e(Pxe 1\ SEE(y,ex)) 
This is compatible with the following syntactic category of see, the Categorial 
counterpart to the second structure in (25). 
(40) (N\S)jVPijN 
We leave irrelevant morphosyntactic details open. In particular, we do not spell 
out the internal structure of NI VPs but abbreviate its category with V PI. 
In the sequel we will show that this semantics of verbs of perception, 
paired with a categorial syntax, meets the main criteria that are discussed in 
the literature. 
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Verdicality This is Barwise's name of the inference scheme 
( 41) John saw Mary leave f= Mary left. 
In an event based semantics, the logical form of Mary left is 3e : LEAVE(M, e). 
As under Higginbotham's original account, this follows from the premise by 
simple first order reasoning. 
Extensionality All elements of an NI perceptual report are transparent, i.e., 
they can be replaced by extensionally equivalent expressions salva veritate. 
Since no intensional operators are involved in our semantics of see, this is 
predicted. 
Absence of scope ambiguities Generally, all scope inducing items that might 
occur in one of the complements of see have matrix scope. Under our ap-
proach, this has nothing to do with the semantics of see but follows from its 
syntax. To start with, quantifiers in the accusative position always have matrix 
scope, for instance: 
(42) John saw Q leave= Qx are such that John saw x leave. 
Since the quantifier occupies an argument position of the matrix verb, it must 
at least take scope over the matrix VP, no matter what particular approach to 
quantifier scope we adopt. 
Coordination behaves similarly, i.e., the following two equivalences hold. 
(43) a. John saw Mary swim and Bill walk= John saw Mary swim and John 
saw Bill walk. 
b. John saw Mary swim or Bill walk = John saw Mary swim or John 
saw Bill walk. 
In any version of CG, conjunctions are considered polymorphic items. 
Their category is X\ X f X, where X ranges over Boolean categories. 4 Rough-
ly, a category is Boolean iff the corresponding semantic type ends up in t. So 
S, N \ S, CN etc. are Boolean categories. The meaning of the coordination 
and is >..QPx.Px 1\ Qx. So in the first sentence in (43a), the substrings Mary 
swim and Bill walk have to be assigned a Boolean category each to make them 
con joinable. 
4Steedman's (1996) syncategorematic treatment of conjunctions amounts to the 
same thing. 
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Under any version of CG, the accusative NP and the NI phrase cannot be 
combined directly to yield a Boolean category. Thus as in the case of quantifier 
scope, the absence of a narrow scope reading is expected. We have to answer 
the question how the wide scope reading is to be derived though. 
Up to the present point, we remained neutral as to which version of CG 
is to be used. To handle this puzzle, we have to be more specific. Since 
Mary and swim do not form a functor-argument structure here, we need a 
certain degree of associativity to deal with this instance of non-constituent 
coordination. So the example can be handled in any version of Combinatory 
Categorial Grammar (CCG, cf. Ades and Steedman 1982) that contains the 
operation of function composition, and in any descendant of Lambek's (1958) 
associative CG. 
As shown in Fig. 5,5 the reading in question can be derived in CCG using 
only type lifting and backward function composition. We abbreviate N \ S as 
V P for convenience. The predicate SEE1 is shorthand for the meaning of see 
(cf. (39)). Since both combinators are theorems of the Lambek calculus, this 
is simultaneously a Lambek derivation. 
Failure of logical equivalence Although the complements of perception 
verbs can be combined by the classical propositional connectives, comple-
ments that are equivalent in classical logic cannot always be exchanged salva 
veritate. For instance, (44b) doesn't have a reading that is equivalent to (44a). 
(44) a. Hegel saw Schelling sneeze. 
b. Hegel saw ((Schelling sneeze and Holderlin eat) or (Schelling sneeze 
and Holderlin not eat)). 
To handle this problem, it has to be remarked that even though the use 
of propositional connective in the "complement" of perception verbs looks 
suggestive, we assume a different treatment of conjunction and disjunction on 
the one hand, and of negation on the other hand. The former connectives al-
ways receive a wide scope interpretation, while negation is predicate negation. 
Therefore we do not expect patterns that look like classical validities to be 
sustained. Under this treatment (44b) is synonymous with (45). 
5The Combinatory branch of CG uses a format for complex categories and for 
derivation trees that differs somewhat from the Lambek trad ition. We chose a com-
promise here in using the backslash in Lambek's sense ("A\ B" takes an argument of 
type A and yields a value of type B) while choosing a CCG-style derivation tree. 
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( 45) (Hegel saw Schelling sneeze and Hegel saw HOlderlin eat) or (Hegel saw 
Schelling sneeze and Hegel saw Holderlin not eat). 
By simple propositional reasoning we can infer Hegel saw Schelling sneeze 
from this. But furthermore we infer that there is an event e that involves 
Holderlin and that is seen by Hegel. This does not follow from ( 44a), so ( 44a) 
and ( 44b) cannot be equivalent. 
The puzzle of Russell's schoolchildren Barwise gives a further desidera-
tum for an adequate semantics of perception reports which is illustrated by the 
following inference scheme. 
( 46) a. Russell sees each boy touch at least one girl. 
b. Russell didn't see any girl being touched by more than one boy. 
c. I= There are at least as many girls as boys. 
As Vlach correctly observes, this inference scheme is not valid. Imagine a 
gameshow where 10 boys have to find a partner among 5 girls. The participants 
cannot see each other, but everybody sits in a booth with several phones each 
of which connects to exactly one participant of the opposite sex (so the boys 
have 5 phones and the girls 10 phones each). Each boy calls one girl, and it 
happens that each girl receives exactly two phone calls. So each girl picks up 
two receivers simultaneously and holds them to her ears (one receiver per ear). 
The TV audience can see all15 participants, but they can only see the left side 
of the girls. Russell was watching this silly show on TV. In this situation (a) 
and (b) are true, but (c) isn't: 
(47) a. Russell saw each boy calling at least one girl. 
b. Russell didn't see any girl being called by more than one boy. 
c. There are at least as many girls as boys. 
This is problematic for the theories of Barwise, Higginbotham, and van 
der Does, since they uniformly predict that if Russell sees a calling b, he also 
sees b getting a call by a. So if Russell would see two boys calling the same 
girl, he would see this girl getting a call from two boys. This makes the argu-
ment valid. Since we don't claim that Russell sees a girl called if he sees a boy 
call her, no such prediction is made. 
To sum up this section, we tried to demonstrate that a fairly innocent mod-
ification of Higginbotham's proposal is sufficient to accommodate Vlach's 
puzzle while preserving its general advantages. Likely a similar adjustment 
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could be made with other theories of the semantics of perceptual reports. 
If we insist on compositional interpretation, this adjustment excludes a one-
constituent analysis of the syntax of perceptual reports though. This in turn 
forces us to adopt a syntactic theory that is able to handle non-constituent co-
ordination, as most versions of CG do. 
6 Conclusion 
In this paper, we have presented some arguments for a reanalysis of NI com-
plements to verbs of perceptual report. We have argued that the semantic 
analysis that takes the NI complement as a constituent denoting a scene or 
situation fails to provide a satisfying account of certain entailments; these se-
mantic properties follow directly on our account, which does not treat the NI 
complements as a single semantic unit. 
Furthermore, our account handles many of the syntactic properties asso-
ciated with NI constructions; indeed, it seems to fare at least as well as the 
standard small clause account. We are, however, left with a residual problem: 
How can we account for the subjectlike properties of the post-verbal NP? On 
the standard account, the subject properties of this NP follow because these 
properties are correlated with tree geometry. We believe, however, that this 
approach to grammatical relations requires an undesirable loosening of the 
relationship between the syntax and the semantics. 
So while subject properties should not be considered as evidence for a 
particular constituent structure, they require an explanation nevertheless. As 
far as the Binding facts are concerned, this might be fairly straightforward 
if we assume that Binding means linking of the anaphor to an superordinate 
argument place of the local verb (see for instance the proposals of Szabolcsi 
1988 of Hepple 1990). Under this perspective, the domain of Binding is the 
local VP rather than the local clause. The other subject properties discussed 
above have to be left as an open problem, however. 
One virtue of CGs is that they maintain a homomorphic relationship be-
tween syntax and semantic structures. While CGs have a pleasingly axiomatic 
structure that clarifies the relationship between natural language syntax and 
logic, they provide no obvious account of grammatical relations. We believe, 
that one task for the grammarian is to elucidate the role that grammatical rela-
tions play both in syntax and in semantics. We have not, however, given such 
a theory in this draft, contenting ourselves with posing the problem as clearly 
as we could. 
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